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PERSISTENCE OF THE GENDER WAGE GAP: THE ROLE OF THE 
INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF PREFERENCES 
 







This paper provides an explanation of the evolution and persistence of the 
gender wage gap due to differences in training within the framework of an overlapping 
generations model with intergenerational transmission of preferences.  “Job-priority” 
and “family-priority” preferences are considered.  Firms’ policy and the distribution of 
women’s preferences influence each other and are endogenously and simultaneously 
determined in the long run.  The results show though the gender gap in training will 
diminish, it will also will persist over time.  This is because both types of women’s 
preferences coexist at the steady state due to the socialization effort of parents to 
preserve their own cultural values. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The wage diﬀerential between men and women has been persistent over
time. Although a decline in the wage gap has been observed since the
1970s, a signiﬁcant gender gap still exists. Altonji and Blank (1999) ﬁnd
that women received 29% lower hourly wages than men in 1995, whereas
the diﬀerence was 46% in 1979.
Gender diﬀerences in on-the-job training are often considered as an im-
portant source of this male/female wage gap. Gronau (1988) estimates that
the gender gap is about 30% and that two thirds of this gap can be explained
by gender diﬀerences in ﬁrm training, so that if this factor was eliminated
the wage gap would be reduced to 10%.1 Likewise, the lower ﬁrm training of
women is often related to their weaker labour force attachment. When some
on-the-job training is necessary to perform a job, it is costly for the ﬁrms to
lose workers. Then employers who view women as being more likely to leave
the ﬁrm will sort women into jobs with fewer training opportunities. Gronau
(1988) ﬁnds that on average, women report that their jobs require only 9
months of training, compared with 20 months for men and that labour force
separations rates are four times as prevalent among women as among men.2
1Other studies that have found that ﬁrm training signiﬁcantly aﬀect the gender wage
gap are Lynch (1992), Barron et al. (1993), Hill (1995), Macpherson and Hirsch (1995),
and Olsen and Sexton (1996).
2More examples can be found in Duncan and Hoﬀman (1979), Royalty (1996), Altonji
and Spletzer (1991), Viscusi (1980), among others. Royalty (1996) points out that about
3Nevertheless, times have changed. Women are becoming more attached
to the labour force. Later cohorts of women show lower separation rates
(Light and Ureta, 1992), and accordingly, gender diﬀerences in the acquisi-
tion of on-the-job training have narroweds u b s t a n t i a l l yi nl a t e ry e a r s( O l s e n
and Sexton, 1996).
Curiously, several papers have addressed the question of the existence of
segregation of women in jobs with less training opportunities.3 However, it
has not been theoretically analyzed how this type of occupational segrega-
tion will evolve and whether it will persi s ta tt h el i g h to ft h er e c e n tc h a n g e s
in the women’s labour force attachment. Both, evolution and persistence of
occupational segregation will depend on whether the commitment of women
to the labour force continues to increase. Costa (2000) points out that al-
though substantial progress has been made, the commitment of men and all
women is not yet comparable.
In order to start with this analysis, it seems interesting to know why
one-quarter of the greater propensity of men to receive company training is explained by
the diﬀerent investment horizons of women.
3See Kuhn (1993) or Barron et al. (1993), for example, for theoretical models in which
workers with weaker attachment to the labour market are segregated to jobs that oﬀer less
training. There are also models that link the lower attachment of women to the labour
force with other low-paying characteristics. For instance, Goldin (1986) ﬁnds women more
likely to occupy jobs with a piece rate system of payment and Bulow and Summer (1986)
ﬁnd women less likely to be oﬀered eﬃciency wage jobs. A survey of the theories of
occupational segregation can be found in Anker (1997).
4women withdraw from the labour market more often than men. Gronau
(1988) found that women leave the labour market due to demographic factors
(e.g., children, marriage, divorce, migration). He states: “In the absence of
this factor, labour force separation rate would have been about the same for
both sexes” (Gronau, 1988, p.292). Viscusi (1980) and Sicherman (1996)
also found similar results; men hardly even interrupt their career for personal
or household considerations. It seems to be a kind of “social norm” that
children internalise during the socialization process. This point leads us, in
turn, to focus on this socialization process. Parents play a crucial role in the
socialization of children; they try to shape the preferences of their children
taking into account the type of labour market that they children will face.
The contribution of this paper is to address this issue. This paper anal-
yses the evolution and persistence of occupational segregation of women
into jobs with less training opportunities, considering that the labour force
attachment reﬂects the attitudes and preferences acquired during the social-
ization process.4 Likewise, the socialization process, in which parents play
a crucial role, will depend on expectations about ﬁrms’ policy. With this
aim in mind, a simple overlapping generations model with statistical dis-
crimination in job assignment, rational expectations and intergenerational
transmission of preferences is proposed.
4See Hakim (2000, 2002) for a study of how lifestyle preferences are a major determinant
of women’s diﬀerentiated labour market careers.
5In the model presented, two types of preferences are considered among
women’s population: job-priority and family-priority preferences. The roles
and attitudes concerning house and market work that are transmitted among
generations will be denoted by preferences. Women with family-priority
preferences get a higher utility from time devoted to family activities so
that when they are confronted with the double responsibility of work and
family, they prefer to leave the labour market. Conversely, women with
job-priority preferences do not leave the labour market. To keep the model
simple, men are assumed to have job-priority preferences as a way to cap-
ture social norms. Children acquire preferences from their parents (vertical
transmission) and/or from some members of the parent’s generation (oblique
transmission). Speciﬁcally, we draw from the model of cultural transmission
by Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2000 a/b, 2001).
Firms in this model choose the on-the job training provided for each
job that they oﬀer. The problem is that ﬁrms cannot distinguish between
a job-priority woman and a family-priority woman; they decide using the
probability of labour force withdrawal of women on average and statistical
discrimination arises (Aigner and Cain, 1977; Cain, 1986). Hence, if employ-
ers view women on average as being more susceptible to leave the labour
market, they will sort women into jobs that require less on-the-job training.5
5As suggested by Becker (1985), the lower women’s attachment to the labour force can
be reﬂected not only in time but also in eﬀort in market work. For a similar model where
ﬁrms statistically discriminate and women could be segregated to jobs where workers eﬀort
6We ﬁnd that some gender wage gap will persist but that a decline in
the male/female wage diﬀerential should be expected. The reason is that
there exists a unique stable steady state of the distribution of preferences
involving both types of women.6
This result is consistent with the one obtained by Coate and Loury
(1993). Their model analyzes the question of the persistence of statistical
discrimination but from a diﬀerent perspective. Particularly, they examine
whether aﬃrmative action policies will eliminate negative stereotypes that
lead some groups to be discriminated against. The persistence of statistical
discrimination could be explained, under some circumstances, by the ineﬀec-
tiveness of such policies to break down the logic that leads minority groups
to make choices that conﬁrm employers’ negative beliefs (stereotypes) in
equilibrium. However, in the model presented in this paper, we analyze the
possibility that statistical discrimination could disappear without any pol-
icy intervention, as a result of changes in attitudes over generations. We
examine whether this mechanism could per se lead to the disappearance of
statistical discrimination.
is easily monitored see Escriche et al. (2000).
There is large body of evidence showing the labour market sorts women into jobs with
low-paying characteristics (see Macpherson and Hirsch, 1995, for example).
6The persistence of gender diﬀerences in labour market outcomes have always concerned
economists, but it has been diﬃcult to explain it theoretically. Becker’s models based
on a “taste for discrimination” explain the existence of the gender gap but predict the
elimination of discrimination by competition (Becker, 1957).
7The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some basic fea-
tures of the model: the types of preferences, the optimal ﬁrms’ policy, the
utility functions and the socialization process. Section 3 describes parents’
education eﬀort. Section 4 computes the steady state of the distribution of
preferences among the women’s population and some comparative static re-
sults. Finally, the discussion of the results and directions for future research
are summarized in Section 5.
2 The model
We consider an overlapping generations model. The women’s population
is a continuum and each individual lives for two periods and is productive
only in the second period. In the ﬁrst period, as a child, the individual is
educated in some preferences and, at the beginning of the second period,
as an adult, she becomes active in the labour market and is hired by a
ﬁrm. Each woman has one female oﬀspring, hence the size of the women’s
population is constant. A new generation replaces the old one in the labour
market.
2.1 Preferences.
There are two types of preferences (j and f) among the population.
Individuals receive demands for non-market use of their time (home labour,
children and care of the elderly, etc.) and they decide whether to leave
8the labour market or not according to their preferences. In this model,
family-priority individuals (those with f-type preferences) withdraw from
the labour market. By contrast, job-priority individuals (those with j-type
preferences) never leave the labour market. We assume that men, as a way
to capture social norms, have job-priority preferences. Women could have
j-preferences or f-preferences. Let qt denote the fraction of job-priority
women at time t among the population of women.
2.2 Firms: the on-the-job training problem.
In this model each individual, at the beginning of the second period of
his life, is hired by a ﬁrm. The period of tenure with this ﬁrm is divided into
a training period and a post-training period. We adopt a simpliﬁed version
of Kuhn’s model (1993).
Workers’ productivity depends on the job they occupy. Speciﬁcally, a
worker’s productivity in the post-training period depends on the job he
is matched with, and post-training output in any job is a function of the
amount of training required to learn it C.L e t f(C) be this function with
f0 > 0,f 00 < 0 and f0(0) = ∞. Productivity in the training period is given
for simplicity by f(C)−C. The training is ﬁrm speciﬁca n dﬁnanced by the
ﬁrm.
Women receive demands for non-market use of their time with an ex-
ogenous probability µ ∈ (0,1) at the beginning of the post-training period.
This probability depends on exogenous factors such as child care facilities,
9household aids, male participation in home labour and so on. As only family-
priority women leave the labour market when such a demand arises, women’s
labour force withdrawal probability is given by
pt =( 1− qt)µ,
where qt is the fraction of j-women at time t, with adult women’s population
normalized to 1. Thus, the withdrawal probability of women pt,g i v e nµ,
is increasing in the proportion of women with family preferences, (1 − qt).
It is assumed that ﬁrms know this probability pt, that is, they know the
probability, on average, that a woman leaves the labour market.
Because the labour market is competitive, ﬁr m si nt h i sm o d e lw i l ld e s i g n
jobs to maximize the expected lifetime incomes of the workers that will
occupy them.
Firms’ problem for women-workers. Since ﬁrms cannot distinguish be-
tween the two types of women, they oﬀer every women the same type of
job. Formally, the problem for ﬁrms is to decide the on-the-job training
that maximizes the expected lifetime productivity of a worker:
max
C
[f(C) − C]+δ(1 − pt)f(C) (1)
subject to a zero-proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t ,w h e r eδ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor






10Let ˆ Ct = ˆ C (qt;δ,µ) denote the solution to the ﬁrm problem (1). It is
straightforward to check that (i) the lower the probability to withdraw from
the labour market µ and (ii) the higher the fraction of job-priority women,
the higher the on-the-job training provided by ﬁrms for women will be.
To focus on essentials, we assume that wages are identical in the training
and post-training period and equal to the average lifetime output of a worker.
Let ¯ f( ˆ Ct) denote this expected average lifetime value of output:
¯ f( ˆ Ct)=
1
2
[f( ˆ Ct) − ˆ Ct]+
1
2
δ(1 − pt)f( ˆ Ct). (3)
Thus, a worker’s wage is higher than his current productivity during the
training period and lower during the post-training period, [f( ˆ Ct) − ˆ Ct] <
¯ f( ˆ Ct) <f( ˆ Ct). Hereafter, we will denote the wages for women in the training
period and the post-training period -to facilitate posterior analysis- by w1
and w2, respectively; hence, w1 = w2 = ¯ f( ˆ Ct).
It is interesting to mention that, in equilibrium, the higher the probabil-
ity of exit from the labour force, the lower the women’s wage. To see this,
we calculate the derivative of expression (3) :






[1 + δ(1 − pt)]f0( ˆ Ct) − 1
i
− δf( ˆ Ct), (4)
which is negative, since f0( ˆ Ct) − 1
1+δ(1−pt) =0because of the ﬁrst order
condition (2).
Firms’ problem for men-workers. The problem when ﬁrms face a male
11applicant is
max
CM [f(CM) − CM]+δf(CM),
where CM is the training on the job for men. The solution of this problem
comes from the ﬁrst order condition f0(C)= 1
1+δ and will be denoted by
ˆ CM = ˆ C (δ). As in the case of women, we assume that the wage is the same
in both periods and equals the annualised lifetime output of a man, that is,
wM
1 = wM
2 = ¯ f( ˆ CM), with ¯ f( ˆ CM)=1
2[f( ˆ CM) − ˆ CM]+1
2δ(1 − pt)f( ˆ CM).
Notice that men’s wages will be higher than women’s wages whenever there
exists some probability that women leave the labour market.
2.3 The women’s utility functions.
The utility depends on the lifetime incomes and also, for family priority
women, on the non-monetary payoﬀ, F, of family time. The utility function
for f women and j women are, respectively,
Uf = w1 + δ [(1 − µ)w2 + µF],
Uj = w1 + δw2,
where δ is the discount factor (for simplicity, the same as the ﬁrm). It is
assumed that the non-monetary payoﬀ F exceeds the wage w2 (speciﬁcally,
F>w 2( ˆ Ct), ∀ ˆ Ct) so that it is rational for family-priority women to leave
the ﬁrm in the post-training period if family responsibilities demand such
action (which occurs with probability µ).
2.4 The cultural transmission of preferences.
12Socialization determines the distribution of preferences among women.
We will draw from the model of cultural transmission of preferences de-
veloped by Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2000 a/b, 2001). Children acquire
preferences through observation, imitation and learning of cultural models
prevalent in their social and cultural environment. In particular, children
are ﬁrst exposed to their families, and then to the population at large. So,
we assume both vertical transmission, with children learning from their par-
ents, and oblique transmission, with children learning from other adults.
The paper by Antecol (2000), concerning cross-country diﬀerences in the
gender gap in labour force participation rates, suggests some evidence of
vertical and oblique transmission of tastes regarding family structure and
women’s roles in market versus domestic work (see Antecol, 2000; abstract).
The socialization of an individual works as follows.7 The mother (type j
or f) educates her child with an education eﬀort τi ∈ (0,1), i = {j,f}.W i t h
probability equal to the education eﬀort, τi, education will be successful and
she transmit her preferences. With probability (1 − τi) the girl does not
adopt her mother’s preferences and she picks the preferences from another
adult women chosen randomly from the population.
Let Piz
t denote the probability that a girl from a mother with preferences
i is socialized to preferences z. The socialization mechanism just introduced
7Since all men have job-priority preferences, the following socialization process is only
relevant for women.




t = τj +( 1− τj)qt, (5)
P
jf
t =( 1 − τj)(1 − qt), (6)
P
ff
t = τf +( 1− τf)(1 − qt), (7)
P
fj
t =( 1 − τf)qt, (8)
For instance, P
jj
t is the probability that a daughter of a job-priority
mother is socialized to job-priority preferences. In particular, with proba-
bility τj, she adopts her mother preferences and with probability (1−τj) she
adopts these preferences from other j women with whom she is randomly
matched.
Given the transition probabilities Piz
t , the fraction of adult women with
job-priority preferences at period t +1is given by





which is the equation on diﬀerences that shows the dynamic of the distribu-
tion of preferences among the women’s population.
3 The education eﬀort choice.
Parents are altruistic and care about their children. The utility a girl will
obtain depends on her preferences. For this reason, mothers try to transmit
14the more valuable preferences through education in accordance with their
own expectations about ﬁrms’ policy.
Mothers can aﬀect their girls’ probability of direct socialization through
some education eﬀort. With probability equal to the education eﬀort, de-
noted by τi, a mother with preferences i will be successful. But educa-
tion eﬀort involves some direct and indirect costs: it is time-consuming,
it conditions the choice of neighborhood and school in order to aﬀect the
social-cultural environment where their children grow up and so on. Let
c(τi) denote the cost of the education eﬀort τi, i ∈ {j,f} and assume that
c(0) = 0,c 0 > 0 and c00 > 0; speciﬁcally, we work without loss of generality,
with the functional form c(τi)=(τi)
2
2k . Thus, we have mothers trying to
maximize their children welfare net of the socialization cost. A mother of





t (τi,q t)V ii(Ce
t+1)+Piz







t are the transition probabilities and V iz(Ce
t+1) is the utility a
mother with preferences i attributes to her child with preferences z if the
child matches a job with an expected amount of training Ce
t+1 (i np e r i o d
t +1 , as an adult).
As in Bisin and Verdier (1998), it is assumed that parents perceive the
welfare of their children only through the ﬁlter of their (parents’) preferences.
This implies that in order to asses V iz(Ce
t+1),am o t h e ro ft y p ei uses his own
15utility functions.8 Hence, mothers obtain higher utility if their children share
their preferences. Formally, it implies that V jj(·) ≥ V jf(·) and V ff(·) ≥
V fj(·) as will be conﬁrmed by the analysis that follows.
Then, taking into account the utility functions, we can establish the






















































Note that the expected utility for a girl socialized as family-priority
type is diﬀerent when evaluated by an f mother or a j mother; that is,
V ff(Ce
t+1) and V jf(Ce
t+1) are diﬀerent because an f mother includes the
psychological payoﬀ F from leaving the labour market and a j mother does
not. Hence, V ff(Ce
t+1) >V jf(Ce
t+1). Hereafter, we denote the relative
gains the mothers perceive for socializing their girls with their own values





t+1) − V jf(Ce






t+1) − V fj(Ce

















8Their own preferences are the best proxy they have for evaluating their child’s welfare;
this particular form of myopia is called imperfect empathy by Bisin and Verdier(1998).
16Now we turn to the maximization problem. The ﬁrst-order condition is:
dP ii
t (·)

































t+1) and ˆ τ
f
t =ˆ τf(qt,Ce
t+1) denote the optimal edu-
cational eﬀorts for both types of mothers. In order to guarantee interior
solutions ˆ τi

























It appears that the eﬀort of mothers to transmit a particular preference
depends on (i) the dominant preferences within the women’s population
(characterized by qt) and (ii) the expectations about ﬁrms’ training policy
(which is characterized by Ce
t+1).






















17Therefore, the socialization eﬀort of job-priority mothers decreases with the
current fraction of j women in the population, as expression (19) shows.
T h er e a s o ni st h a tt h el a r g e rt h ef r a c t i o nqt, the better children are social-
ized to the j preferences by the social environment; in other words, oblique
transmission acts as a substitute for vertical transmission.9 By contrast,
the socialization eﬀort of family-priority mothers, ˆ τ
f
t ,i n c r e a s e sw i t hqt. The
larger the fraction qt, t h em o r ef a m i l y - p r i o r i t ym o t h e r sm u s ti n c r e a s et h e i r
socialization eﬀort to oﬀset the pressure of environment if they want to have
their child share their same preferences. Notice that this result holds the
expected on-the-job training constant and (as it has been shown in the pre-
vious section), employer training increases with the fraction of job-priority
women (i.e., ˆ Ct+1 = ˆ C (qt+1;δ,µ). It is assumed that each parent takes as
given qt+1, that is, the expected fraction of j women in the population since
she considers the inﬂuence of her own socialization eﬀort on the evolution
of qt negligible.
The other factor that determines the education eﬀort of mothers is their
expectations about the ﬁrms training policy.
Lemma 1 The socialization eﬀort of job-priority mothers, ˆ τj(qt,Ce
t+1), in-
creases with the expected on-the-job training Ce
t+1; by contrast, the socializa-
tion eﬀort of family-priority mothers, ˆ τf(qt,Ce
t+1),i sd e c r e a s i n gw i t hCe
t+1,































Proof. This result is obtained by derivation of (17) and (18) with respect
to Ce
t+1.
The way mothers’ socialization eﬀorts change with respect to their ex-
pectations about the training requirements, diﬀers according to type. The
greater the on-the-job training, the higher the expected lifetime wages irre-
spective of the children’s preferences. Thus, the opportunity cost of with-
drawing from the labour market increases and, consequently, it is more ad-
vantageous to be a j w o m a nt h a na nf woman. This is the reason why the
education eﬀort of j mothers increases and the eﬀort of f mothers decreases.
Preferences among the women’s population evolve over time, according
to (9). In the next section, the pattern of the distribution of preferences in
the long run is analyzed.
4 The distribution of women’s preferences and ﬁrms’
training policy in the long run
The dynamics of the women’s distribution of preferences is derived by sub-
stitution of the optimal education eﬀort, ˆ τ
j
t and ˆ τ
f
t from (17) and (18), into
19expression (9):
qt+1 = qt + qt(1 − qt)
h
ˆ τj(qt,Ce




We assume that agents have rational expectations which implies Ce
t+1 =
ˆ Ct+1 and, as we have shown in Section 1, the optimal on-the-job training
is a function of the fraction of j women in the population, that is, ˆ Ct+1 =
ˆ C(qt+1;δ,µ)). Therefore, the above expression can be rewritten as follows:
qt+1 = qt + qt(1 − qt)
h
ˆ τj(qt,q t+1) − ˆ τf(qt,q t+1)
i
, (23)
which is the equation in diﬀerences for qt that characterizes the dynamics
of the women’s distribution of preferences.
This dynamic has three steady states: (i) qs =0 , (ii) qs =1and (iii) qs =
ˆ qs ∈ (0,1) where ˆ τj
s =ˆ τf
s. From equation (23), it is straightforward to check
that when the socialization eﬀorts of the two types are equal, the distribution
of preferences is also stationary at a level denoted by ˆ qs; equalizing the l.h.s
of (17) and (18), we get
kδµ[w2(Cs)](1 − qs)=kδµ[F − w2(Cs)]qs, (24)
and the steady state, ˆ qs, solves this equation.
Proposition 1 Assume the training requirements determined by ﬁrms is
given by ˆ Ct = ˆ C (qt;δ,µ) and women have rational expectations, Ce
t+1 =
ˆ Ct+1 . The only stable steady state of the distribution of preferences among








Proof. See Appendix .
This Proposition establishes that, in the long run, there exists no dis-
tribution of preferences in which all women have job-priority preferences
or family-priority preferences. Society achieves an interior steady state
ˆ qs ∈ (0,1) whatever the initial distribution of preferences; the heterogeneity
of preferences is preserved in the long run. Notice that if F<2w2(·), at the
steady state there will be a predominance of job priority preferences, that




. (Similarly, if F ≥ 2w2(·), the steady state will be ˆ qs ∈ (0, 1
2].)
By assumption, the value of family time F is higher than wage w2, and from
expression (25) it is obvious that the lower the value assigned to family
time, the higher the proportion of j women at the steady state. Figure 1
illustrates the result of Proposition 1 (considering F<2w2(·)).N o t et h a t
there exist two diﬀerent areas: (i) ∀qt < ˆ qs we have that ˆ τ
j
t > ˆ τ
f
t and (ii)
from ∀qt > ˆ qs we have that ˆ τ
j
t < ˆ τ
f
t . As we have shown above, these eﬀorts
are equal for ˆ qs.
Assume a traditional society (q0 close to 0), w h e r em o s tw o m e nh a v e
family-priority preferences. As mothers try to transmit their own prefer-
ences and the j women are in a minority, the education eﬀort of these type
o fw o m e ni sh i g hi no r d e rt oo ﬀset the environment inﬂuence on their chil-




τ  > τ











Figure 1: Convergence to the steady state of the women distribution of
preferences ˆ qs.
As a consequence of this ﬁrst eﬀect, job-priority preferences tend to expand
among young generations (see (23) considering ˆ τ
j
t > ˆ τ
f
t ). However, there
exists a second factor which must be considered. The eﬀort of mothers to
socialize children in their own preferences is not independent of the poten-
tial beneﬁts for inheriting these preferences. On this issue, families share
identical points of view. The higher the expected wage, the higher the op-
portunity cost of leaving the labour market will be. Then j mothers have
an additional incentive to intensify their education eﬀort while the incen-
tive to transmit family preferences for f mothers decreases (Lemma 1). In
this context, the second eﬀect reinforces the ﬁrst one, and the fraction of
22job-priority women increases over generations (graphically, this change is
represented by a movement along the bold curve).
To summarize, a traditional society evolves towards a society with more
job-priority women. Nevertheless, society does not reach a state where all
women are j because this expansion of j-preferences continue to the extent
that the eﬀort ˆ τ
j
t exceeds the eﬀort ˆ τ
f
t . B u tn o t i c et h a tt h em o t h e r se ﬀort
evolves also with prevalent preferences in society (since oblique transmission
substitutes vertical transmission). Accordingly, the eﬀort of family priority
mothers ˆ τ
f
t increases with the expansion of j preferences (see (20)) and, by
contrast, the eﬀort of j mothers, ˆ τ
j
t, decreases (see (19)). Thus these eﬀorts
equal before a homogeneous society (qs =1 )i sa c h i e v e d .
Two direct implications of the coexistence of preferences in the long run
arise in this model.
Lemma 2 Women’s labour force withdrawal rate will not equal men’s rate
at the steady state and, accordingly, the job training received by women will
never exceed men’s.
Logically, this result determines the evolution of wages.
Proposition 2 If training levels in jobs are chosen optimally for men and
women, and preferences are transferred among generations according to the
socialization process described, the gender wage gap will persist in the long
run.
23The gender wage gap is the diﬀerence between ¯ f( ˆ Ct) and ¯ f( ˆ CM). Since
at the steady state women leave the labour market with higher probability
than men, and wages are decreasing with this probability - see derivative
(4)- the previous result arises.
Comparative statics
The determinants of the distribution of preferences within the women’s
population at the steady state ˆ qs ( µ, and F)a ﬀect the ﬁrm training in
female jobs and, consequently, the gender wage gap in the long run.
First, a lower probability to exit the labour market µ of f women re-
sults in a higher fraction of job-priority women in the long run. Implicit



























which is negative because: (i) the denominator is positive since condition
(27) is veriﬁed at the steady state and (ii) the numerator is negative given
that the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal training (2) implies ∂ ˆ C
∂µ < 0.
Second, a lower non-monetary payoﬀ of family care and housework F











this expression is clearly negative arguing, as before, with respect to the de-
nominator. The evolution and changes of this psychological payoﬀ is beyond
24the scope of this paper. It seems probable that education at school and in
the family could aﬀect the “value” that a women places on family work,
but this is a cultural norm that we consider should evolve without policy
interferences since these could be controversial.
Summarizing, the gender gap will be lower the lower the exit probability
µ of f women and the lower the payoﬀ of non-market activities F will be.
Finally, our model may provide part of an explanation for the decrease
in the labour market exit rates of women (formally, pt) in the last decades.10
Three factors can contribute to explain it. Firstly, an increase in the facilities
to enabling mothers to combine market and family work (the parameter µ
would diminish). Secondly, a decrease in the non-monetary payoﬀ F for
the non-market work. It is diﬃcult to fully comprehend the evolution of
this factor as it does not seem that women value child care any less now
than in recent decades. Thirdly, an increase in women who prefer market
to home work; labour market participation of women has increased in most
Occidental economies. This fact could be a consequence of increases in qt.
To the extent that the preferences are private information, again, it is not
easy to monitor the evolution of this variable.
10Viscusi (1980) found that whereas females in manufacturing industries quit 80% more
often than did men in 1958, the discrepancy has dropped to 16% by 1968.
255 Discussion of the results and future research.
This paper provides an explanation for the continued existence of the gen-
der wage diﬀerential. The model presented has to be seen as a ﬁrst step
at integrating into a theoretical framework the interrelationship between
gender diﬀerences in labour market withdrawal rates, ﬁrms’ hiring policy
and pre-market discrimination in the socialization process. Undoubtedly,
girls and boys are not educated in the same way with respect to the rel-
ative value of market and non market work. This diﬀerent treatment is
reﬂected in women’s labour market behavior. Nevertheless, society evolves.
Parents realize that ﬁrms’ policy can change and, consistent with this fact,
try to transmit the most valuable preference (from their own point of view)
to their children. As the distribution of preferences among the women’s
population changes, women’s probability of leaving the labour market also
changes and, in turn, so do the ﬁrms’ policy. Speciﬁcally, employers, that
statistically discriminate among workers by gender, will observe how female
exit rates change and, accordingly, they will adapt the optimally designed
jobs for men and women. There is a phenomenon of reinforcement between
these three factors, each eﬀect feeds back into the others.
The main result of the model is that the gender wage diﬀerential will
persist, though a decrease is expected. Women will be sorted into jobs that
provide less training than jobs oﬀered to men. This result emerges because
in the long run both types of women’s preferences coexist.
26The comparative static exercises show that the gender diﬀerential in on-
the-job training and the relative proportion of both types of preference in
the long run depend on a set of factors. This gender diﬀerential decreases
(and the fraction of job-priority women increases) with the facilities to at-
tend family responsibilities and increases with the utility that women derive
from non-market activities. Consequently, the extension of policy measures
favoring equal opportunities in the labour market (such as child allowances,
a lengthening of the period of maternity and paternity leave, ﬂexible work-
time arrangements, the provision of crèches and, in general, those measures
which help women combine work and child care/housework) will eventually
reduce the diﬀerences in the labour market. Nevertheless, policy-makers
should be concerned with non-labour market variables such as education,
family policy, and a more equal sharing between the sexes of child care and
household work.
We have shown that for an initial traditional society, the fraction of
family-priority women will decrease over time. Thus three results emerge
directly from the model presented. First, gender diﬀerences in levels of on-
the-job training and in the wage gap will diminish. Empirical studies support
this result; Olsen and Sexton (1996) found that training diﬀerences lessened
between the 1970s and the 1980s. In 1976, men acquired 118 percent more
current training on average that women; by 1985, that training diﬀerential
had fallen to 90 percent. O’Neill and Polacheck (1993) show that recent
27decline in the gender gap reﬂects improved training for women and this
could be due to a decrease in employer discrimination, or an increase in
women’s education eﬀorts and/or work attachment.
Second, the labour market participation of women will increase as a
result of the spread of job-priority preferences. Costa’s (2000, p.23) ﬁndings,
for example, conﬁrm this result. Since 1950 there has been an unprecedented
increase in the participation of married women in paid labour in the United
States. Between 1950 and 1998 their participation rates rose from 22% to
62%, with the largest increase between 1950 and 1980.
Third, the diﬀerentials on participation rates between men and women
will persist, since at the steady state there will always exist a fraction of
family-priority women. Preferences are private information and, conse-
quently, we cannot observe their true evolution. But behavioral outcomes,
which are the consequence of these preferences, become indirect measures
of preferences. Notably then, as we have pointed out above, this rate has
increased greatly in Occidental countries but it has not equalled that of men
(60% compared to 90%, approximately). In this sense, Costa (2000, p.25)
pointed out that “the relatively small size of married women’s wages and
income elasticities of labour market participation suggest that those women
who are out of the labour force may very well have a very strong taste for
remaining at home. Unless these tastes change the labour force participa-
tion rates of married women may not increase much above their current rate
28of 62 percent”. This observed apparent top of women’s participation rates
is consistent with the prediction of this model in that in the long run both
types of preferences will coexist.
An interesting question for future research concerns the analysis of whether
the educational level women bring to the labour market could be a signal
of labour market withdrawal. Concerning this extension, Sicherman (1996)
points out that schooling has a negative eﬀect on departures for most of the
non-market related reasons. Royalty (1996) ﬁnds that the positive eﬀect of
education on training is due to diﬀerences in turnover by education level.
On the other hand, formal education can be considered by job-priority
mothers as a socialization instrument if we assume that schooling promotes
this preferences (Bowles and Gintis, 1998, suggest that schooling promotes
a particular type of preferences that ﬁrms specially appreciate -“incentive
enhancing preferences”-). Thus the model can be extended considering fam-
ily and school-college to be substitutes in the socialization process for job-
priority mothers.
A Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is divided into three steps. Firstly, it is proved that the steady
states qs =0and qs =1are unstable. Secondly, we establish the existence
and uniqueness of the interior steady state ˆ qs. Finally, we prove the stability
ˆ qs.
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Evaluating (26) at the steady state qs =0and qs =1 , we obtain that:
dqt+1
dqt
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> 1.
It is easy to check that
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ˆ τj (1,1) − ˆ τf (1,1)
¤
<
0 (see expressions for optimal educational eﬀorts (17) and (18)).
Second step. In order to prove the existence and uniqueness of the steady
state which solves the equation (25), qs =
w2( ˆ C(qs;δ,µ))
F , we deﬁne the func-
tions g(qs)=qs and h(qs)=
w2( ˆ C(qs;δ,µ))
F . The function g(qs) is increasing
and linear: g0(qs)=1 . The function h(qs) is increasing and concave. Deriva-



































30Summarizing, g(qs) is increasing and lineal, h(qs) is increasing and con-
vex with h(0) > 0 and h(1) < 1. Hence there exits a unique interior solution
ˆ qs ∈ (0,1) that veriﬁes (25).
To simplify the proof of stability of ˆ qs notice that at the steady state ˆ qs









¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
qs=ˆ qs
< 1 (27)
Third step. Global stability of ˆ qs.
We ﬁrst show that for all q0 ∈ (0,1) there is a perfect foresight path of
distribution of preferences that converges to the steady state qs.
Assume qt ≥ ˆ qs, and women expect ˆ qs <q e




t+1 = qt+1 ≤ qt and the expectation is self-conﬁrmed.
Assume qt < ˆ qs and women expect qt <q e




t+1 = qt+1 >q t and the expectation is self-conﬁrmed.
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31where expressions (19) and (20) have been substituted in (29), and (21) and







1 − ˆ qs (1 − ˆ qs)kδµF
1 − ˆ qs (1 − ˆ qs)kδµ
∂w 2( ˆ C(qt+1;δ,µ))
∂qt+1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
qt+1=ˆ qs
. (31)
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< 1. We have shown that this condition holds at
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Finally, the expression (26) can be rewritten, substituting derivatives






w2( ˆ C (qt+1)) − Fqt
i
− qt (1 − qt)kδµF
1 − qt (1 − qt)kδµ
∂w 2( ˆ C(qt+1))
∂qt+1
.
Clearly ˆ qs does not depend on k, and neither do
∂w 2( ˆ C(qt+1))
∂qt+1 .T h e r e f o r e ,
considering k small enough, both the numerator and denominator of (31)
will be positive. Then
dqt+1
dqt > 0 for all qt. (The dynamic (23) does not















< 1, this is a suﬃcient
condition for global stability.
References
[1] Aigner, D. and Cain, G. (1977). ‘Statistical theories of discrimination
in labor markets’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 30(2), pp.
32175-187.
[2] Altonji, J. G. and Blank M. (1999). ‘Race and gender in the labour
market’, in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Eco-
nomics, Vol 3C (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
[3] Altonji, J. G. and Spletzer J.R. (1991).‘ Worker characteristics, job
characteristics and the receipt of on-the-job training’, Industrial and
Labour Relations Review, 45 (1), pp. 58-79.
[4] Anker, R. (1997). ‘Theories of occupational segregation by sex: An
overview’, International Labour Review, 136, No.3, pp. 315-39.
[5] Antecol, H. (2000). ‘An examination of cross-country diﬀerences in the
gender gap in labor force participation rates’, Labour Economics 7,
pp.409-426.
[6] Barron, J. M., Black D. A. and Loewenstein M. L. (1993). ‘Gender
diﬀerences in training, capital and wages’, The Journal of Human Re-
sources, 28 (2), pp. 343-64.
[7] Becker, G.S. (1957). The economics of discrimination. Chicago, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
[8] Becker, G.S. (1985). ‘Human capital, eﬀort and the sexual division of
labour’, Journal of Labor Economics, 3, S33-S58.
33[9] Bergman, B. (1974). ‘Occupational segregation, wages and proﬁts when
employers discriminate by wage or sex’ Eastern Economic Journal,1 ,
Nos. 2-3.
[10] Bisin A. and Verdier T. (1998). ‘On the cultural transmission of pref-
erences for social status’ Journal of Public Economics, 70, pp. 75-97.
[11] Bisin A.and Verdier T. (2000a). ‘Beyond the melting pot: cultural
transmission, marriage, and the evolution of ethnic and religious traits’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (3), pp. 955-88.
[12] Bisin, A. and Verdier T.(2000b). ‘A model of cultural transmission,
voting and political ideology’, European Journal of Political Economy,
16 (1), pp. 5-29.
[13] Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. (2001). ‘The economics of cultural transmis-
sion and the dynamics of preferences’, Journal of Economic Theory,
97(2), pp. 298-319.
[14] Bowles , S. and Gintis H. (1998) ‘Incentive-enhancing preferences’,
mimeo, University Massachusetts, Amherst.
[15] Bulow, J.I. and Summers L.H. (1986). ‘A theory of dual labour markets
with application to industrial policy, discrimination and Keynesian un-
employment’, Journal of Labour Economics, 43 (1), July, pp. 376-414.
34[16] Cain, G.D. (1986). The economic analysis of labour marker discrimina-
tion: a survey. In: Ashenfelter, O., Layard, R. eds., Handbook of Labour
Economics, Vol 2 (North Holland, Amsterdam), pp. 693-785.
[17] Coate, S. and Loury, G. (1993). ‘Will aﬃrmative-action policies elim-
inate negative stereotypes?’, American Economic Review, December,
pp. 1220-1240.
[18] Costa D. L. (2000). ‘From mill town to board room: the rise of women’s
paid labor’, NBER working paper no. 7608
[19] Duncan, G.J and Hoﬀman S. (1979). ‘On-the-job training and earnings
diﬀerences by race and sex’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 6(4),
pp. 594-603.
[20] Escriche, L., G. Olcina and R. Sánchez, 2000, Estatus y discriminación
en el mercado de trabajo: la función de la educación,U n i v e r s i t yo f
Valencia .PhD.
[21] Goldin, C. (1986). ‘Monitoring costs and occupational segregation by
sex: a historical analysis’, Journal of Labour Economics, 4 (1), pp. 1-27.
[22] Gronau, R. (1988). ‘Sex-related wage diﬀerentials and women’s inter-
rupted careers-the chicken or the egg?’, Journal of Labor Economics, 6
(3), pp. 277-301.
35[23] Hakim, C., (2000). Work-lifestyle choices in the 21st century: Prefer-
ence theory.U K ,O x f o r dU n i v e r s i t yP r e s s .
[24] Hakim, C., (2002). ‘Lifestyle preferences as determinants of women’s
diﬀerentiated labor market careers’, Work & Occupations, 29 (4), 428-
59.
[25] Hill, E. (1995). ‘Labor market eﬀects of women’s post-school-age train-
ing’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 49 (1), pp. 138-149.
[26] Kuhn, P. (1993). ‘Demographic groups and personnel policy’, Labour
Economics, 1, 49-70.
[27] Light A. and Ureta, M. (1992),‘Panel estimates of male and female job
turnover behavior: can female nonquitters be identiﬁed?’, Journal of
Labour Economics, vol10, no.2, pp. 156-181
[28] Lyinch, L.M. (1992). ‘Private sector training and the earnings of young
workers’, American Economic Review, 82 (1), pp. 299-312.
[29] Macpherson , D.A. and Hirsch, B.T. (1995). ‘Wages and gender compo-
sition: why do women’s jobs pay less?’, Journal of Labour Economics,
13 (3), pp. 426-471.
[30] Olsen, R. N. and Sexton E. A. (1996). ‘Gender diﬀerences in the returns
to and the acquisition of the on-the-job training’, Industrial Relations,
35 (1), pp. 59-77.
36[31] O’Neill, J. and Polachek S. (1993). ‘Why the gender gap in wages nar-
rowed in the 1980s’. Journal of Labor Economics, 11 (1, Part I), pp.
205-228.
[32] Royalty, A. (1996). ‘The eﬀects of job turnover on the training of men
and women’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 49 (3), pp. 506-521.
[33] Sicherman, N. (1996). ‘Gender diﬀerences in departures from a large
ﬁrm’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 49 (3),pp. 484-505.
[34] Viscusi, W.K. (1980). ‘Sex diﬀerences in worker quitting’, Review of
Economics and Statistics, 62(3), pp. pp. 388-398.
37